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THE PROPOSED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF FORCED PERPETRATION,
ENTRAPMENT, INTOXICATION AND INSANITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code, in both its original form as intro-
duced in the Ohio House of Representatives' and in its substitute form as
finally passed by the House,' would codify forced perpetration (duress,
necessity, and obedience to military orders), entrapment, intoxication and
insanity as affirmative defenses. These four affirmative defenses, in both
their original and substitute forms, represent the subject matter of this
comment. The fundamental approach will be to separately analyze each
defense in both forms with a view toward understanding what practical ef-
fect each form would have. This analysis will also include a critical evalu-
ation of the defenses, and suggestions for improvements in those areas
where improvement is thought to be needed. For the convenience of the
reader, at or near the beginning of each discussion the texts of the original
and substitute forms of the proposed defense will be set out.
This comment is not an attempt to thoroughly discuss the historical de-
velopment of each defense, complete with an extensive examination of
competing theories underlying the foundation of each defense. However,
brief background sketches of the defenses are provided. Neither is this an
exercise in comparative legal analysis. Such attempts and exercises have
been done by others in the areas of these four defenses.3 Generally, the
thrust of this comment is aimed directly at the legislative process.
IFinal Report of the Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures, PRoPosED OHIO CRRIINAL CODE (1971) [hereinafter cited as PRoP. OHIO CRL%.
CODE]. The text of the proposed legislation is incorporated in HOUSE BILL NUMtBER 511,
109th Ohio General Assembly (1971) [hereinafter cited as H.B. No. 511].
2 PRop. OIo Cmi. CODE as amended in SUBSrnuTE HousE BILL NULiBER 511, 109th
Ohio General Assembly [hereinafter cited as SUB. ILB. No. 511].
aForced Perpetration: Hersey, Compulsion as a Defense to Climial Prosecution, 11
OKLA. L. REV. 283 (1958); Note, Necessity as a Defence in Criminal Cases, 33 DICK. L REV.
138 (1929); Note, Criminal Law-Contempt for Refusal to Answer-Duress as a Defense,
33 TUL. L. REV. 237 (1958).
Entrapment DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its Histor',
Theory and Application, 1 SAN. FRAN. L REV. 243 (1967); Mfikell, The Doctrine of Entrap-
ment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L REv. 245 (1942); Watt, The Defense of Entrap-
ment, 13 CM. L.Q. 313 (1971); Williams, The Defense of Entrapment ard Related Prob-
lews in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORD. L. REv. 399 (1959).
Intoxication: Hurt, Criminal Responsibility and the Right to Treatment for Intoxication
and Alcoholism, 57 GEO. LJ. 835 (1969); Merrill, Drunkenness and Reform of the Criminal
Law, 54 VA. -REV. 1135 (1968); Reinert, Alcoholism: Disease or Habit?, 32 FED. PROB.
12 (1968); Starts, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism and Traditional Criminal Law Thcori,
19 S. CAR. L REV. 349 (1967); Tao, Alcoholism As a Defense to Crime, 45 NOTRE DAtME
IAw. 68 (1969).
Insanity: Brady, Abolish the Insanity Defense.-No!, 8 Hous. L. REv. 629 (1971); I.ewin-
stein, The Historical Development of Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Actions, 14 J. FoR.
ScL 275 (1969); Comment, Criminal Lau-Rehabilitation, a Thesis; Punishment, the Anti-
thesis-Insanity Defense in the Balance, 19 DEPA.UL L REV. 14 0 (1969); Note, Criminal
Law--The A.L.. Model Penal Code Insanity Test, 44 TUiL L REv. 192 (1969).
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II. FORCED PERPETRATION
There are three separate affirmative defenses included within the pro-




Sec. 2901.32. (A) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge
that the actor was intimidated into committing the offense by force or the
threat of force against himself or another, which force or threat was such
that a person of ordinary resolution could not have resisted it under the
circumstances. A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the pres-
ence of her husband, to any presumption of intimidation. 4
The substitute proposal:
Sec. 2901.32. (A) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge
other than a charge of which the death of another is an element, that the
actor was intimidated into committing the offense by force or the threat of
force against himself or another, which force or threat was such that a
person of ordinary resolution could not have resisted it under the circum-
stances. A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of
her husband, to any presumption of intimidation.5
Although the defense of duress must be defined by statute or by judi-
cial enuniciation, the meaning of duress is suggested by a standard English
language dictionary:
[C]ompulsion... by which a person is ... forced to do or forbear some
act by actual imprisonment or physical violence to the person or by threat
of such violence.... 6
At common law, generally duress was a defense to all crimes with the ex-
ception of homicide.7  Other conditions were also imposed on the use of
duress as a defense. For example, the duress had to be "present, imminent,
and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well grounded ap-
prehension of death or serious bodily injury. . . ."' In addition, it had to
be directed at the life of the individual claiming the defense."
In its original form,'0 the proposed affirmative defense of duress would
have modified the common law in two significant ways. First, it would
4 PRoP. OHIo CrIM. CODE § 2901.32(A).
5 PROP. OIO CRIM. CODE § 2901.32(A) (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
6 WEBSMuR'S THIRD NEW INTrNATnONAL DICTIONARY 703 (1961).
7 Moore v. State, 23 Ala. App. 432, 127 So. 796 (1929), cert. denied, 221 AILa. 50, 127
So. 797 (1930); Nal v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 700, 271 S.W. 1059 (1925).
8 Statev. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25,27 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1953).
9 R. I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.
1949).
10 PROP. OHio CRIM. CODE § 2901.32(A).
(Vol. 88
7CIMINAL CODE SYMfPOSIUM
have applied the defense to all offenses. Secondly, it would have permitted
the duress to be directed toward persons other than the defendant claim-
ing the defense. Additionally, the original proposal would have modified
the common law by not requiring, in all cases, that the threat be death or
serious bodily injury. The original proposal simply stated that the defense
is established if "the actor was intimidated into committing the offense by
force or the threat of force against himself . ..such that a person of
ordinary resolution could not have resisted it under the circumstances.""
Consequently, the force or threat of force sufficient to invoke the defense
could be directed at property, which was not true under the common law.
In its original form, the defense was substantially similar to that sug-
gested by the Model Penal Code.'2
The substitute version of the defense' would do little more than codify
the common law defense of duress. While it would permit the duress to
'be directed toward persons other than the actor of the offense, it would
allow the defense to be asserted only against offenses that do not have the
death of another as an element. It is evident by the changes reflected in
the substitute version that the House appears to view the scope of the de-
fense as the main concern. It is also evident by the changes that the House
appears disinclined to accept a substantial departure from the common
law. Such reluctance to depart from the common law should be reconsid-
ered.
The defense of duress is appropriate when considering some offenses
which have the death of another as an element. For example, if the de-
fendant is compelled, at the threat of the loss of his or a member of his
family's life, to participate in a felony that escalates into a felony murder
and he had no direct part in the murder, the defense of duress should logi-
cally be available to the defendant. It is not under the substitute version.
Whether a murder occurred or not during the commission of the felony,
in the example above, had no bearing on the nature of the compelled de-
fendant's involvement. Therefore, it should have no bearing on whether
or not the defense of duress is available to the defendant. If no murder
had occurred during the felony, the compelled defendant would have the
defense of duress available to him. If a murder is committed, the com-
pelled defendant, through no change by him in his role, suddenly is de-
prived of the defense. There is no logical explanation for this difference.
Under present Ohio law a person involved in a felony-murder who
did not do the actual killing can only be prosecuted and punished as the
killer if he is found to have conspired with the killer to commit the felony
1 Id.
12 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Proposed Ofidal Draft 1962) [hereinafter referred to as
ALP.C. (P.O.D.)].
13 PRop. OsnO CIM. CODE § 2901.32(A) (as amended in SUB. H-B. No. 511).
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which results in a homicide.' 4 Consequently, under present Ohio law a
defendant, who by duress was forced to drive the get-away car in a robbery
which resulted in a killing, can escape prosecution for the murder because
his duress would negate the conspiracy. However, under the substitute
version of the defense, such a defendant could not escape prosecution by
pleading duress.
Even in the situations where a compelled defendant kills an innocent
victim, duress should perhaps be considered as a mitigating factor. The
defendant did not originate the killing in his mind, nor did he want to fol-
low through with it. However, because his life would be taken if he did
not kill, he chose to kill. If first degree murder is charged, duress should
be accepted as a factor sufficient to reduce the charge to manslaughter.
Yet there appears to be no room for mitigation in the substitute version.
Perhaps there should be.'"
Finally, the last sentence of both the original and substitute versions
eliminates the common law presumption that a wife who commits a crime
in the presence of her husband did so on the command of her husband.1"
B. Necessity
The original proposal:
Sec. 2901.32. (B) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge
that the actor committed the offense in the reasonable belief that it was
necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury sought
to be prevented by the section defining the offense charged.' 7
The substitute proposal:
Sec. 2901.32. (B) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge
other than a charge of which the death of another is an element, that the
14 State v. Doty, 94 Ohio St. 258, 113 N.E. 811 (1916); State v. Palfy, 11 Ohio App. 2d
142, 229 N.E.2d 76 (1967).
15 Under the original version of PROP. OHIo CRIM. CODE § 2903.03 (A) (the manslaughter
section), duress might have proved to be a factor sufficient to reduce a first degree murder
charge to manslaughter.
Original § 2903.03(A):
No person, while under extreme emotional stress for which there is reasonable ex-
planation or excuse, shall knowingly cause the death of another. The reasonable-
ness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the offender's situation at the time of the offense, under circumstances
as he believed them to be.
Such a possibility would depend on the definition of the word "knowingly." Although this
possibility may still exist under the substitute version of § 2903.03(A), PROP. OHIO RCIM.
CODE § 2903.03(A) (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511), it is even less certain than under the
original version.
Substitute § 2903.03(A):
No person, while under extreme emotional stress brought on by serious provoca-
tion reasonably sufficient to incite him into using deadly force, shall knowingly cause
the death of another.
16 Commonwealth v. Adams, 186 Mass. 101, 71 N.E. 78 (1904).
17 PROP. OHiO CRIM. CODE § 2901.32(B).
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actor committed the offense in the reasonable belief that it was necessary
to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury sought to be pre-
vented by the section defining the offense charged.18
The defense of necessity arises in situations where an actor finds him-
self in the position of having to make a choice between two acts, both of
which will result in harm to society, and voluntarily chooses one of the acts
in order to avoid the harm incident to the other. The common law rec-
ognizes the defense and makes it available to the actor if he chooses the
less harmful act in order to avoid the greater harm.1 However, the com-
mon law found no place for the defense when the actor's choice resulted
in a homicide. 0
In its original form,"' the proposed defense of necessity would modify
the common law by making the defense available in all cases including
homicide. However, the substitute version reinserts the common law idea
that any charge "of which the death of another is an element,"2 cannot
be met with the defense of necessity. Therefore, the substitute version,
as was the case with the substitute version of the defense of duress, is bas-
icaUy a codification of the common law.
This return to the common law may not be wise. Allowing the defense
of necessity to a defendant who committed an offense "in the reasonable
belief that it was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than
the injury"2 3 of the offense is a standard consistent with the belief that
preservation of life is the supreme value--even in situations where the
defendant commits an offense that takes life. For example, the defendant
whose act takes one life which results in the saving of many lives is an
appropriate candidate for the defense of necessity, especially when the de-
fendant had a reasonable belief that failure to take the one life would
result in the loss of many lives. This is not to say, however, that the de-
fendant who takes another's life to save his own has acted in a reason-
able belief that his act was necessary to avoid a greater public or private
injury. The proposed defense of necessity as formulated in the original
version would allow the defense in the first example but not the second.
On the other hand the substitute version would allow the defense in
neither situation-a result which has little or no justification.
If the legislature should decide that the original version is unaccept-
able, then as was suggested in the discussion on the defense of duress, the
legislature should at least give some thought to including the concept of
181POP. O1O CRIL CODE § 2901.32(B) (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
19 See United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873 (No. 14,470) (C.C. Mass. 1834).
20 United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15,383) (C.C. Pa. 1842); Queen v. Dud-
ley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273,15 Cox Crim. Cas. 624 (1884).
2 1 PROP. OHIo Cumi. CODE § 2901.32(B).
22PRoP. Osno CRiuL CODE § 2901.32(B) (as amended in SUB. lB. No. 511).
23 PpOP. OMo CMn. CODE § 2901.32(B).
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necessity as a mitigating factor in those cases where the actor's taking of
life resulted in the saving of more lives.
Additionally, it may be worth conjecturing whether the defense of
necessity in its original or substitute version is viable at all. By allowing
a defendant to escape prosecution if he can prove that he committed the
offense charged in the reasonable belief that committing the crime was nec-
essary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the one caused, the
defense of necessity appears to be fostering a policy which encourages in-
dividuals to substitute their judgment for that oE the legislature. This
could have grave consequences on the well-being of the public peace and
for the defendant, especially if a reasonable jury does not find that there
was a reasonable belief. For example, a person may earnestly believe that
burning draft records is a reasonable act necessary to stop what he per-
ceives to be a greater public injury,. the Vietnam war. Because of the
existence of the defense of necessity, the person burns draft records believ-
ing he cannot be successfully prosecuted for doing it. Similarly, a person
may believe it is reasonable in preventing the decline and decay of public
morals, to destroy a movie house which shows X-rated films, and knowing
of the defense of necessity is fearless of prosecution and goes out to burn
such a movie house.
C. Obedience to Military Orders
The original proposal:
Sec. 2901.32. (C) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge
that the actor, in engaging in the conduct constituting the offense, did no
more than execute an order of his superior in the armed forces, which
order the actor did not know to be unlawful.24
The substitute proposal is identical to the original.2 1
The proposed defense of obedience to military orders reflects the be-
lief that for the military to function successfully, lawful orders, or at least
orders which the soldier "did not know to be unlawful," must be obeyed
without the fear of criminal prosecution.
Under present Ohio law, military personnel in the Ohio National
'Guard are subject to punishment for the willful disobedience of lawful
orders of superior commissioned officers .2  According to present Ohio
law, it appears that a soldier could be punished by civilian authorities if
he obeyed an unlawful order which caused injury, even if he did not know
the order was unlawful. On the other hand, if the soldier thought the
order was unlawful, when it was not, and subsequently disobeyed it to
avoid what he perceived to be certain civilian punishment, he would be
24 PROP. OIo GRiM. CODE § 2901.32(C).
25PRop OIO CRM. CODE § 2901.32(C) (as anlended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
28O o REV. CODE ANN. § 5924.90(B) (Page Supp. 1970).
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punished by the military because he disobeyed a lawful order. Conse-
quently, in those instances where it is extremely difficult to determine
whether or not an order is lawful or unlawful, the soldier is placed in the
unpleasant dilemma of believing that he may be punished no matter what
he does. This dilemma is greatly eliminated for the soldier under the pro-
posal because he has to know, not just suspect, that the unlawful order
that he obeys is unlawful before he can be punished in civilian courts
for obeying the unlawful order.
It should be emphasized that under the proposal a soldier cannot be
punished for obedience to just any unlawful order. He can be punished
only for obedience to those unlawful orders he knows to be unlawful,
which is not the equivalent of "has reason to know." This affirmative de-
fense, therefore, is harder to rebut than the defense of necessity, which
speaks of the defendant in terms of his "reasonable belief," - T or the de-
fense of duress, which speaks of him in terms of "a person of ordinary res-
olution." ' The question is therefore, what the individual soldier believes
rather than what a reasonable soldier believes. It appears that the House
of Representatives wishes to offer a higher degree of protection to citizens
when they act as soldiers than when they act as mere citizens.
III. ENTRAPMENT
The original proposal:
Sec. 2901.33. (A) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge that
the offense was incited by a public servant as defined in Section 2921.01
of the Revised Code, or person acting in cooperation with him, for the
purpose of obtaining evidence to prosecute the offender.
(B) The defense described in division (A) of this section is not avail-
able if the public servant or person cooperating with him merely afforded
the offender the opportunity or facility for committing the offense in fur-
therance of a criminal purpose originated by the offender, his accomplice,
or person with whom he conspired to commit the offense.
(C) The defense described in division (A) of this section is not avail-
able when causing or threatening physical harm to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment is an element of the offense charged.3
The substitute proposal:
Sec. 2901.33. (A) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge that
both of the following apply:
(1) The offense was incited by a law enforcement officer or person
acting in cooperation with him, using threats or persistent urging, for the
purpose of obtaining evidence to prosecute the offender.
2TPRop. OHIO CaML CODE § 2901.32(B) (as amended in SuB. H.B. No. 511).
28 PROP. OHIO CRIN. CODE § 2901.32(A) (as amended in SuB. H.B. No. 511).
29 PRop. Omo CRmL CODE § 2901.33.
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(2) The offender had no disposition to commit the offense upon be-
ing afforded the opportunity or facility for its commission, and would
not have committed the offense but for the threats or persistent urging of
the person perpetrating the entrapment.
(B) The defense described in division (A) of this section is not
available when causing or threatening physical harm to a person other
than the person perpetrating the entrapment is an element of the offense
charged.
(C) As used in this section, repeatedly affording an offender the op.
portunity or facility for committing an offense does not, in itself, consti-
tute "persistent urging."30
It is generally agreed that the defense of entrapment is a recent and
strictly American doctrine.-" There has not been general agreement in
American courts, however, on a definition of the defense of entrapment.
The two major entrapment cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court, Sorrells v. United States2 and Sherman v. United States,' split the
court five to four on the matter of a definition. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
writing the majority opinion in Sorrells, held that entrapment was available
as a defense
when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government,
and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they
may prosecute 34
This definition, followed by the majority in Sherman, creates two basic re-
quirements before the defense of entrapment can be made out. First, the
criminal act must have been conceived in the mind of and induced by the
government. Second, the person who was induced to perform the crim-
inal act must have been an innocent person who would not have been dis-
posed to commit the act on his own.
In contrast to the majority opinion in Sorrells, the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Roberts expresses a formulation that does not require the
defendant to have had an innocent predisposition. This formulation, of-
ten referred to as the minority view, states: "Entrapment is the conception
and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its com-
mission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery,
persuasion, or fraud of the officer." 35 Similarly, the concurring opinion
in Sherman formulated the defense along the same lines, with special
emphasis on the official conduct rather than on the defendant's character.
30 PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2901.33 (as amended in SUB. H.P.. No. 511).
31 Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U, PA. L. RV. 245, 246
(1942).
32287 U.S. 435 (1932).
33 356 U.S. 369 (1958).




Thus, "[t~he crucial question... is whether the police conduct revealed in
the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings re-
spond, for the proper use of governmental power.""0 Simply put, the pri-
mary factor under the minority view is the nature and extent of police con-
duct.
A survey of the few reported Ohio cases involving the defense of en-
trapment 7 indicates that Ohio is in the camp of the majority. An exami-
nation of the following language found in State v. Good,"8 a narcotics case,
indicates how committed Ohio is to the majority view:
Where the crime committed is of such harmful character and the in-
terests of the public are so deeply endangered, the criminal act should be
punishable regardless of the state of mind of the actor, and the defense of
entrapment should, under such circumstances, fall of its own weight.
.. -Where only the opportunity to commit a criminal act is afforded the
defendant by the conduct of the informer, and the tendencies of the de-
fendant dearly indicate that he intends to disregard injury to the public
good and voluntarily accepts the opportunity afforded him to violate the
law, particularly where the crime committed is one usually committed in
secret and is of such a depraved character that the public must be pro-
tected, he should.., stand the consequences of his act.39
The Good court spoke in these terms despite the fact that a police in-
former, during the course of what the record indicated was aggressive and
persistent urging, pulled a gun and threatened to kill the defendant if he
did not sell the narcotics 0 The absence of any critical comments about
the aggressive and threatening nature of the police informant's conduct
indicates that this particular Ohio court did not share the Sorrels-Sherman
minority's concern with policing official conduct. The reason for the ab-
sence of critical comments about the police informer's conduct may be
because the majorities in Sorrells and Sherman, which the Good court fol-
lowed, were not particularly concerned with police conduct. The Sorrells-
Sherman majority rested the entrapment defense on the policy ground that
a legislative body which described an act as an offense (in Sorrel/s the leg-
islative body was Congress and the act was the sale of liquor during pro-
'hibition) did not intend the act to be an offense when committed at the
instigation of a government official. 1 In contrast, the minorities in Sor-
rells and Sherman rested the entrapment defense on the policy ground that
the function of law enforcement officials is the detection of crime, not the
36 356 U.S. at 382.
37 State v. Good, 110 Ohio App. 415, 165 N.E.2d 28 (1965); Langdon v. Board of Li-
quor Control, 98 Ohio App. 535, 130 N.E.2d 430 (1954); State v. Griffths, 27 Ohio Op.
307 (C.'. 1943).
38 110 Ohio App. 415, 165 NB.2d 28 (1965).
39 Id. at 430, 165 N..2d at 38.
40 Id. at 435, 165 NE.2d at 41.
41 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 445-48 (1932).
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creation of it, and that the only way to deter official instigation of crimi-
nal acts is to deny the government the conviction of those officially inspired
to act criminally. Justice Roberts, writing for the minority in Sorrdls,
emphasized this when he stated:
[Cjourts must be dosed in the trial of a crime instigated by the govern-
ment's own agents. No other issue, no comparison of equities as between
the guilty official and guilty defendant, has any place in the enforcement
of this overruling principle of public policy. 42
In its original form, 4 3 the proposed entrapment defense would have re-
flected a change in Ohio law by following the minority formulation of
the defense with its emphasis on policing the conduct of law enforcement
officers. This is especially evident when considering the comments of the
drafters of the original proposal: "[The proposed defense of entrapment]
is based . . . on public policy which forbids the creation of crime by
those charged with preventing it, and a recognition that the only effective
way to deter the practice is to frustrate conviction of entrapped offenders." 44
The original proposal would have allowed the defense when the criminal
act was "incited" by government action but would have withdrawn the de-
fense when the government "merely afforded . . . the opportunity or facil-
ity" for its commission and the "criminal purpose originated" in the mind
of the defendant.45 Additionally, the defense would not have been avail-
able if the defendant caused or threatened physical harm to someone
other than the entrapper.
The essence of the original proposal would appear to be that the de-
fense is available if the defendant can show he would not have committed
the act "but for" the inducement of government action. Corroboration of
this belief can be found in the drafters' statement: "It is [our) . .. inten-
tion that divisions (A) and (B) together permit the defense of entrap-
ment only when the offense would probably not have been committed ex-
cept for the urging of the governmental official involved.1 4a
The substitute version of the defense4' is similar to the original pro-
posal in only one way: The defense is not available to the defendant
whose act caused or threatened physical harm to a person other than the
entrapper. With that feature the similarity abruptly halts and a codifi-
cation of the defense according to the Sorrel/s majority begins. The sub-
stitute version allows the defense if the defendant can establish that he
did the act because he was "incited" by the use of "threats or persistent
421d. at 459.
4 3 PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2901.33.
44 PROP. OHIO CuM. CODE § 2901.33, Committee Comments at 51.
4 5 PRop. OHIo CPML. CODE § 2901.33.
4 6 PROP. OHIo CRIM. CODE § 2901.33, Committee Comments at 52.
47 PROP. OMO CM . CODE § 2901.33 (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
(Vol. 3
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urging" on the part of the government and can further establish that he
had no disposition to commit the act upon being afforded the opportu-
nity. s To further emphasize the difficulty of establishing the defense un-
der the substitute version, consider the version's statement that "repeatedly
affording an offender the opportunity or facility for committing an of-
fense does not, in itself, constitute persistent urging. ' The original
version proposed that if the offense were "incited" by official action, a de-
fense could be made out. Incite is defined as to arouse to action, stir up,
spur on or urge on.5 Since the substitute version states that repeatedly af-
fording an opportunity or facility does not, in itself, constitute persis-
tent urging, it is probable that the substitute version also implicitly holds
that repeatedly affording an opportunity for violation does not constitute
incitement either, which it would under the original version.
The differences between the two versions are sharp. Under the origi-
nal, the defense can be more easily made out than under the substitute.
The fact that the original was conceived within the confines of a relatively
apolitical atmosphere while the substitute was conceived with political
considerations as an input, can probably account for the sharp differences.
It is submitted here, also in the isolation of an apolitical atmosphere, that
good politics does not necessarily make good law.
The question of when entrapment should be permitted as a defense is a
difficult one which requires the balancing of competing values. On the
one hand there is the value of the legitimate detection of crimes, while on
the other there is the value of protecting the unwary innocent or unwary
but temptable individual who has a tendency toward criminal activity and
needs all the official help he can get to stay straight. The proper balancing
of the two is the difficult task inherent in defining an entrapment defense.
It is submitted here that the original version succeeded at the difficult task
while the substitute version failed.
The original version would have permitted necessary police conduct
which would detect those crimes which seldom have witnesses other than
the direct participants, such as prostitution and the illegal sale of narcotics.
Under the original version, the police could proposition a suspected prosti-
tute or attempt to make a narcotics transaction so long as they "merely
afforded the offender the opportunity or facility for committing the of-
fense in furtherance of a criminal purpose originated by the offender.
Although this structuring of the defense would not allow the pros-
ecution of a young female runaway who needed money and had not con-
sidered prostituting herself to get it until propositioned by government ac-
tion, such a structuring would allow the prosecution of a professional
481d.
49 Id.
50 WELBsThrmS TH NEw INTERNATIONAL DicnIoNARY 1142 (1961).
51 PROP. OHIO CXM CODE § 2901.33.
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prostitute. The original version permitted the prosecution of those police-
solicited offenders who originated the criminal purpose in their own minds,
rather than having it planted there by police conduct. Police solicitation
that goes beyond the mere affording of an opportunity or facility is also
prohibited. Because of these factors, the original version supported legiti-
mate police detection of crime and the rehabilitation of unwary innocents
and unwary but temptable individuals who have criminal tendencies and
need official help, not temptation, to straighten themselves out.
The substitute version is harsh, and if enacted, would effectively abol-
ish the defense of entrapment in Ohio. It cannot be denied that there are
those in our society who need corrective help, not crippling, officially-in-
spired temptation. The values of reforming and rehabilitating the crim-
inally inclined and protecting the unwary innocent take second place in
'the substitute version to the prosecution of police created crime. By specif-
ically stating that "repeatedly affording an . . . opportunity or facility ...
'does not, in itself, constitute persistent urging"5 2 and by specifically re-
quiring that a necessary element of the defense be proof that the defen-
dant "would not have committed the offense but for the threats or per-
sistent urging,"53 the substitute version effectively puts the defense out of
reach of all but the purest. A defendant who had the disposition to do
an act but was successfully controlling that disposition could not use the
defense if government action weakened his control and prompted him to
act criminally. Likewise, the defendant who had no predisposition to
commit an offense but who, through the officially repeated affording of an
opportunity developed a disposition and did commit the offense, would
not have the defense available to him.
The function of the police is to detect, not encourage crime. As ex-
plained earlier, the detection of certain crimes does require a degree of
police solicitation. The original version recognized this and allowed the
legitimate detection of those crimes, while at the same time protecting
unwary innocents and unwary but temptable misfits. However, the sub-
stitute version appears to recognize little else but the detection of crime,
with the possible result that those police who are not well-trained and
supervised may engage in the illegitimate creation of crime.
Finally, it is important to note that the original version of the entrap-
ment defense, by focusing on police conduct as the important element in
determining what constitutes entrapment, is not breaking new ground.
Indeed, as pointed out by others, "the current [United States Supreme
Court] majority [viewpoint] has expressly declined to disavow perma-
nently [the minority] . . . viewpoint which focuses on the conduct of the




government."' ' Additionally, the same source notes' that the majority
viewpoint itself spoke of the entrapment defense in terms of the "integrity
of administration" of justice 6 and "objectionable police methods." Fur-
thermore, there has been a reassessment of the defense among the lower
'federal courts with emphasis on the fairness of government conduct, 9 sug-
gesting that the strength of the majority view may be deteriorating to the




Sec. 2901.35. (A) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge based
on a voluntary act, as opposed to an omission to act or a failure to meet a
duty, that at the time the offense was committed, the actor was intoxicated
to such an extent that he lacked sufficient mental capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminal nature of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
(B) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge based on an
omission to act or a failure to meet a duty, as opposed to a voluntary act,
that at the time the offense was committed, the actor was involuntarily in-
toxicated to such an extent that he lacked sufficient mental capacity to ap-
predate the criminal nature of his omission or failure, or that he was
physically incapable of performing or meeting the required act or duty.
(C) As used in this section:
(1) "Intoxication" means a distortion or impairment of mental or
physical capacities resulting from the introduction into the body of any
substance including without limitation alcohol or any medication, drug or
abuse, or harmful intoxicant.
(2) "Voluntary intoxication" means any intoxication not defined as
involuntary in division (C) (3) of this section, and includes without limi-
tation any intoxication resulting from the actor's drug abuse.
(3) "Involuntary intoxication" means intoxication induced by force,
coercion, duress, fraud, or mistake, and also means intoxication, other than
intoxication resulting from drug abuse, which is grossly excessive consid-
ering the nature and amount of the intoxicating substance involved, and
which is caused either by an abnormal bodily condition, or by an unex-
pected reaction with other substances in the body.P3
The substitute proposal:
Sec. 2901.35. (A) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge
that, at the time the offense was committed, the actor was involuntarily
MUnited States v. Morrison, 348 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1965).
55Id.
56 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,448-49 (1932).
5 7 Shermianv.United States, 356 U.S. 369,372 (1958).
58 Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir.), ccrt. dcnicd, 375 U.S. 884 (1963);
Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.), cert. denicd, 358 U.S. 883 (1958).
59 PROP. OIO CRn. CODE § 2901.35.
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intoxicated to such an extent that he lacked sufficient capacity to appreciate
the criminal nature of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law.
(B) Involuntary intoxication is not a defense to any offense of which
an element is operation of a motor vehicle, locomotive, watercraft, or air-
craft while under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse, or of
which an element is carrying or using any firearm or dangerous ordnance
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse. Voluntary in.
toxication is not a defense of any offense.
(C) As used in this section:
(1) "Intoxication" means a distortion or impairment of mental or
physical capacities resulting from the introduction into the body of any
substance, including without limitation alcohol, any medication, or any
drug of abuse.
(2) "Voluntary intoxication" means any intoxication not defined as
involuntary in division (C) (3) of this section, and includes without lim-
itation any intoxication resulting from the actor's drug abuse.
(3) "Involuntary intoxication" means intoxication induced by force,
coercion, duress, fraud, or mistake, and also means intoxication, other than
intoxication resulting from drug abuse, which is grossly excessive consid-
ering the nature and amount of the intoxicating substance involved, and
which is caused either by an abnormal bodily condition, or by an unex-
pected reaction with other substances in the body.°°
The following, taken from the earliest reported English case denying
intoxication as a defense, is the seed of the substantially similar general
American rule that intoxication is not a defense to crime:
If a person that is drunk kills another, this shall be felony, and he shall
be hanged for it, and yet he did it through ignorance, for when he was
drunk he had no understanding nor memory; but inasmuch as that igno-
rance was occasioned by his own act and folly, . .. he shall not be privi-
leged thereby.61
There are today, however, several significant exceptions to this general
rule. The first exception is essentially a real defense and arises when the
defendant can show he was too intoxicated to do the act charged." The
second arises when the intoxication is proved to be involuntary either
through mistake or fraud,6 3 duress," the use of prescribed medication,6"
or the normal use of an intoxicant combined with a weakened physical or
mental condition.6" The third exception resembles the defense of insan-
ity. This exception arises when the defendant's chronic use of an intoxi-
cant has reached the level of a disease such that the defendant's mind has
6 0 PRop. OHIo Cim. CODE § 2901.35 (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
61 Reninger v. Fogossa, 1 Plowd. 1, 19; 75 Eng. Rep. 1, 31 (K.B. 1551).
62 Jenkins v. State, 93 Ga. 1, 18 S.F. 992 (1893).
63 State v. Alie, 82 W. Va. 601, 96 S.F. 1011 (1918).
64 Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99,297 P. 1029 (1931).
6 5 Perkins v. United States, 228 F. 408 (4th Cir. 1915).
66 Leggett v. State, 21 Tex. App. 382, 17 S.W. 159 (1886).
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deteriorated to the point where he is in a near constant state of being in-
capable of distinguishing between right and wrong and is not responsible
for his actions.67 The last exception arises when the defendant, as a result
of intoxication, lacked the requisite mental state to be found guilty of the
crime charged where the crime requires a specific intent or knowledge-
and may be considered more as a factor going to the mitigation of the
charge rather than as a defense. 8
The distinction between the third and the last exceptions is that in the
third the defense is complete because of a total lack of responsibility,
while in the last exception the defense is only partial because the intoxi-
cation is temporary and goes only to negating those elements, if any, of
the charged offense which concern a specific intent or knowledge. Thus, the
last exception holds the defendant responsible for his actions and will not
allow him to escape criminal sanction, although the degree of his respon-
sibility, and therefore, the degree of his criminal sanction is determined
by his intoxicated state. The third exception does not hold the defendant
responsible and will permit the defendant to escape all criminal sanctions.
The present general rule in Ohio that was originally announced in
184369 is similar to the general rule put forth above and also contains the
exceptions noted above. Paragraph number two of the syllabus in R1scker
v. State7" provides a useful statement of the defense of intoxication in
Ohio:
Acute alcoholism or mental incapacity produced by voluntary intoxication
existing temporarily at the time of the homicide is generally no excuse or
justification for the crime. Proof of such intoxication, however, is com-
petent and proper for the jury to consider as bearing upon the question of
intent and premeditation, . . or to show that no crime was committed.i1
The original version proposed two differing applications for the de-
fense. Which application is chosen would depend on whether the intoxi-
cation is involuntary, and on whether there has been a voluntary act or
an omission to act or a failure to meet a duty. If the criminal charge is
based on a voluntary act, the defense would be allowed if the defendant
can demonstrate he was so intoxicated (either voluntarily or involuntar-
ily) as to lack the "sufficient mental capacity either to appreciate the crimi-
nal nature of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law."72 If the criminal charge is based on an omission to act or a fail-
ure to meet a duty, the defense would be allowed only when the defendant
can demonstrate he was involuntarily intoxicated to the extent that "he
6 7 Maaconnehey v. State, 5 Ohio St. 77 (1855).
68 Cline v. State, 43 Ohio St. 332, 1 N.E. 22 (1885).
69 Walton v. State, I Ohio Dec. Repr. 32 (Sup. C. 1843).
70 119 Ohio St. 189, 162 N.E. 802 (1928).
71 Id. at 189-90, 162 N.E. at 802-803.
7 2
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lacked sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of his
omission or failure or that he was physically incapable of performing or
meeting the required act or duty."73 According to the drafters of the orig-
inal proposal, the purpose for the differing applications "is to prevent a
defense based on intoxication where the actor seeks to avoid a duty to act
by voluntarily becoming intoxicated. 74
In its original form, the proposed defense defines intoxication beyond
the traditional notion of alcoholic intoxication, to include intoxication as a
result of other substances such as drugs of abuse and medication. Addi-
tionally, the original version provides definitions for voluntary intoxication
and involuntary intoxication. The substitute version reflects substantially
similar offerings. Further similarity between the two proposals, however,
is not to be found. For example, the substitute version states: "Voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to any offense."75  'his is at the opposite
lend of the pole from the original version which allowed it under certain
conditions when there is an affirmative act. Furthermore, the substitute
version recognizes only involuntary intoxication as a defense but does not
recognize it as a defense to all offenses. It is a defense when the defendant
was involuntarily intoxicated to the extent that he lacked "sufficient capac-
ity to appreciate the criminal nature of his conduct, or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law."' 76 It is not a defense to any offense which
has as an element the "operation of a motor vehicle, locomotive, water-
craft, or aircraft while under the influence of [intoxicants] . . ., or [the)
• . . carrying or using [of] any firearm or dangerous ordnance while under
the influence of [intoxicants] .... 77
It is submitted that while both the original and substitute versions have
infirmities, the substitute version has more. The basic infirmity with the
original version is that it is structured so broadly that any individual who
can get so intoxicated that he no longer has the sufficient capacity to appre-
ciate the criminal nature of his conduct can perform an act of rape or
petty larceny and assert intoxication as a defense. In the instance where
the individual who gets that intoxicated is a chronic alcoholic or drug ad-
dict and is unable to stop getting intoxicated before he starts, the defense
is sensible. However, in the instance where the individual who gets that
intoxicated is not a chronic alcoholic or drug addict and is able to stop get-
ting intoxicated before he starts, the original proposal appears to make
little sense, especially in light of recent federal court cases.
In Robinson v. California78 the United States Supreme Court reversed
73ad.
74 PROp. OHIO CRnm. CODE § 2901.35, Committee Comments at 56.
75 PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODn § 2901.35 (as amended in SuB. HB. No. 511).
76 Id.
7 Id.
78 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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a conviction for narcotics addiction asserting that addiction was a disease
and the eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibited subjecting a nar-
cotic addict to criminal punishment for being a narcotic addict. The
Fourth Circuit case of Driver v. Hinnant,9 suggests chronic alcoholism
is also a disease, as does the District of Columbia Circuit case of Easter v.
District of Columbia," in addition to several medical authorities.8 ' As-
suming a similarity between a narcotic addict and a chronic alcoholic,
'the result in Robinson should apply to a similar case involving a chronic
alcoholic. Whether it does is questionable. The United States Supreme
Court in Powell v. Texas, 2 held that a chronic alcoholic could be punished
for public intoxication. Although the case did not hold that a chronic
alcoholic can be punished for his status as a chronic alcoholic, punishing
him for public intoxication seems to represent the substantial equivalent.
Nevertheless, it does appear that narcotic addicts and chronic alcoholics
cannot be punished for simply being addicts and alcoholics. Because of
Powell and Watson v. United States, it seems that such individuals can
be punished, however, for actions which result from their status as addicts
or alcoholics.
An individual whose actions harm society should be incapacitated.
However, individuals who cause harm as a result of a status over which
they have no control should not be prosecuted and punished as criminals.
In addition to being cruel and unusual punishment, such action seems to
be a misapplication of rehabilitative remedies, if one assumes a prime goal
of the criminal law is rehabilitation. The medically ill and diseased need
the rehabilitating aid of physicians and not the debilitating effects of to-
day's prisons. This is not to say that individuals who suffer from narcotic
addiction and chronic alcoholism and cause harm as a result of their con-
dition should not be incapacitated. It is only to say that they should not be
tried as criminals but treated as ill persons and committed to a facility
designed to restore their health.
To permit the use of the defense of intoxication as a means to prevent
such individuals from being treated as criminals is sensible. These indi-
viduals never had the initial requisite mental state to stop the inflow of in-
toxicants in the first place, let alone the requisite mental state, once intoxi-
cated, to appreciate the criminal nature of their conduct should their bodies
perform an act that society considers criminal. However, the defense seems
to grow meaningless when made available to the individual who had the
79 356 F.2d 761, 763-64 (4th Cir. 1966).
SO 361 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
812 M. CEciL. and R. LOEB, A TEXTOOK OF MEIcINE 1625 (10th ed. 1959); At GuT-
TMAcEER and R- WEIHOFEN, PSYcmATRY AND THE LAW 318-22 (1st ed. 1952); F. JELLINE ,
THE DISEASE CONcEPT OF ALCOHOUSM 41-44 (1960).
82 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
83 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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requisite mental state to stop taking the intoxicant before he got to the
state where he finally lacked the sufficient mental capacity to conform
his conduct to the law's requirements. To allow the defense of intoxica-
tion to one who was capable of remaining sober is the equivalent of excus-
ing criminal conduct that results from irresponsible behavior.
This is not to say that a defendant who killed an individual while vol-
untarily intoxicated and is charged with first degree murder for the homi-
cide cannot introduce the fact of intoxication to disprove the element of
premeditation and thereby get the charge reduced. It is only to say that
a defendant who killed an individual while voluntarily intoxicated cannot
use that fact as a defense to the killing and thereby escape all punish-
ment. It is submitted that the drafters of the original proposal are incor-
rect when they state that the original proposal "codifies and updates the
Ohio rule that intoxication is a defense to a crime when it is of such a de-
gree as to negate the culpable mental state required for commission of the
offense. '8 4 Present Ohio law as set forth in Rucker v. State85 and Clinc v.
State"' does not hold that intoxication is a defense to such crimes, but only
that intoxication can reduce the crime charged. If the drafters believe the
word "updates" rebuts this criticism, then it is submitted that they should
have used the phrase "what the [drafters] believe updates," rather than
the word "updates" unmodified.
In comparison to the original version, the substitute version recognizes
only involuntary intoxication as a defense, and then not under all circum-
stances. The basic criticism of the substitute version is that it defines in-
voluntary intoxication as "intoxication induced by force, coercion, duress,
fraud, or mistake,"'8 7 and yet it does not then recognize the defense as
against every offense. On its face the situation is paradoxical. If an in-
dividual has the state of intoxication involuntarily forced upon him, and
thereafter drives an automobile and is arrested, to prosecute him for
drunken driving is the equivalent of prosecuting him for having forced
upon him an intoxicating substance-an event the defendant could not
stop or control. This result is unjustifiable by any standard of reason!
The substitute version also states that "voluntary intoxication is not a
defense to any offense."88s While this is simply a statement of what is the
accepted general rule, the absence of any enunciation of the exceptions to
the general rule cited earlier, and the absence of any of the judicially an.
nounced rules allowing the fact of intoxication to be used to reduce the
criminal charge, cause one to believe that the substitute version of the de-
84 PRoP. OHIO CrIM. CODE § 2901.35, Committee Comments at 55.
85 119 Ohio St. 189, 162 N.E. 802 (1928).
88 43 Ohio St. 32, 1 N.E. 22 (1885).





fense means to disallow those exceptions and judicially announced rules.
This is especially believable in light of what the substitute version has
done with the defense of involuntary intoxication. If such an interpreta-
tion is correct, it is submitted here that only injustice would be served. A
defendant who kills while so intoxicated that he does not know what he is
doing, lacks the culpable mental state required for commission of capital
murder. However, if the suggested interpretation is correct, the defen-
dant could be charged with capital murder and be unable to use his intoxi-
cated condition as a factor bearing on reducing the charge.
As an alternative to both the original and substitute proposals, the fol-
lowing is offered:
Sec. 2901.35 (A) Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any of-
fense. Whenever the offense charged has a requisite mental element,
evidence of intoxication is admissable to show the absence of such mental
element, or to show that no crime was committed.
(B) It is an aftirmative defense to a criminal charge that, at the time
the offense was committed, the actor was involuntarily intoxicated to such
an extent that he lacked sufficient capacity to appreciate the criminal nature
of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(C) As used in this section:
(1) "Intoxication" means a distortion or impairment of mental or
physical capacities resulting from the introduction into the body of any
substance, including without limitation alcohol or any medication, drug of
abuse, or harmful intoxicant.
(2) "Voluntary intoxication" means any intoxication not defined as
involuntary in division (C) (3) of this section, and includes without lim-
itation any intoxication resulting from the actor's drug abuse.
(3) "Involuntary intoxication" means intoxication induced by force,
coercion, duress, fraud, or mistake, and also means intoxication, other than
intoxication resulting from drug abuse, which is grossly excessive consid-
ering the nature and amount of the intoxicating substance involved, and
which is caused either by an abnormal bodily condition, or by an unex-
pected reaction with other substances in the body.
This suggested alternative is a combination of portions of both the
original and substitute versions, and of portions of the present Ohio law as
announced in Cline v. State."9 It is believed this suggestion corrects the
paradoxes of the substitute version and further corrects the overbreadth
found in the original.
V. INSANITY
The original proposal:
Sec. 2901.36. (A) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge that,
at the time the offense was committed, and as a result of the actor's mental
disease or defect, he lacked sufficient mental capacity either to appreciate
69 43 Ohio St. 32, 1 N.E. 22 (1885).
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the criminal nature of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law.
(B) As used in this section:
(1) "Mental disease" means any illness which impairs the capacity of
a person to use self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of
his affairs and social relations, and includes without limitation any such
illness resulting from or characterized by chronic alcoholism or drug de-
pendence.
(2) "Mental defect" means any physiological condition which results
in or is characterized by subnormal intellectual functioning, and includes
without limitation mental retardation and impairment of intellectual func-
tioning resulting from illness or injury.
(3) Neither mental disease nor mental defect includes any abnormal-
ity manifested solely by repeated criminal acts or other anti-social con-
duct.90
The substitute proposal:
Sec. 2901.36. (A) It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge
that, at the time the offense was committed, and as a result of the actor's
mental disease or mental defect, he lacked sufficient capacity either to ap-
preciate the criminal nature of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.
(B) As used in this section:
(1) "Mental disease" means any illness which impairs the capacity
of a person to use self-control, judgment, and discreton in the conduct of
his affairs and social relations.
(2) "Mental defect" means any physiological condition which results
in or is characterized by subnormal intellectual functioning, and includes
without limitation mental retardation and impairment of intellectual func-
tioning resulting from illness or injury.
(3) Neither mental disease nor mental defect includes any abnormal-
ity manifested solely by repeated criminal acts.91
The defense of legal insanity has had several formulations since Daniel
M'Naghten attempted to kill Robert Peel. The formulation in l'Nagh.
ten's Case92 contained two tests: Did the defendant (1) know what he was
doing or (2) if he did, did he know it was wrong?
To establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that
he did not know ... [it] was wrong.93
A second formulation 94 employed the two tests of the M'Naghten formula
but added a third test, that of irresistible impulse. This formulation al-
90 PRoP. OHIo CRim. CODE § 2901.36.
91PRop. OHIO CaL CoDE § 2901.36 (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
92 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (K.B. 1843).
93 Id. at 722.
94 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577,2 So. 854 (1887).
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lowed the defense when an offender's act resulted from his powerlessness
to resist because of his mental state, even though he knew what he was
doing and knew it was wrong. A third formulation was devised in Dur-
ham v. United States95 and abandoned both of the above formulations.
The rule in Durham simply held that a defendant had made out an insan-
ity defense "if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect."9 A fourth formulation appeared in the 1961 Third Cir-
cuit case of United States v. Currens.7 The Currens formulation allowed
a defendant the defense of insanity if he, at the time he committed the
unlawful act and "as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substan-
tial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which
he is alleged to have violated.""8
The Ohio formulation of the insanity defense is found in State v.
Staten,9 and reflects the two tests of the M'Naghten formula plus irresist-
ible impulse.
In order to establish the defense of insanity, the accused must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that disease or other defect of his
mind had so impaired his reason that, at the time of the criminal act with
which he is charged, either he did not know that such act was wrong or
he did not have the ability to refrain from doing that act.100
This formulation by the Ohio Supreme Court reflects much similarity
with the Model Penal Code's formulation. 10'
The original insanity defense proposal would have codified the formu-
lation expressed in State v. Staten, with one exception: the defendant
would not have to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
In addition to codifying Staten, the original proposal would define mental
defect and mental disease. For purposes of later discussion it is useful to
note that the definition of mental disease not only meant any illness which
impaired the capacity of a person to use self-control, but specifically in-
cluded, "without limitation any such illness resulting from or characterized
by chronic alcoholism or drug dependence."' 02
Unlike the other affirmative defenses discussed here, there is complete
similarity between the original and substitute versions of the insanity de-
fense with the exception of two points. First, by virtue of proposed sub-
stitute § 2901.05,x°3 the requirement of Staten that the defendant must
95 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
96 Id. at 874-75.
97 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cit. 1961).
981d. at 774.
99 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N.B.2d 293 (1969).
100 Id. at 21, 247 N.E.2d at 299 (footnotes omitted).
1o' MLP.C. § 4.01 (P.O.D.).
102 PROP. OHIO Cnt . CODE § 2901.36.
103 PRop. OMO CaRN. CODE § 2901.05 (as amended in SUB. I-B. No. 511).
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prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence is reestablished in the
substitute version, whereas it is not in the original. Second, that element
of the definition of mental disease cited earlier, which relates to "illness
xesulting from or characterized by chronic alcoholism or drug depend-
ence," is deleted in the substitute proposal. The major criticism of the
substitute version centers on this deletion.
The only probable conclusion that can be drawn from the removing of
that portion of the definition of mental disease that relates to chronic alco-
holism or drug dependence, is that the House Judiciary Committee does
not consider chronic alcoholism or drug dependence to be mental diseases.
If this conclusion is correct, it is suggested that the deletion is unwise,
especially in light of the substitute version of the defense of intoxication.
A defendant who committed an unlawful act while suffering from the ex-
treme symptoms of chronic alcoholism or drug dependence cannot use the
defense of intoxication as set forth in the substit.te version of that de-
fense. If the contraction of the definition of mentVl disease indicates that
chronic alcoholism or drug dependence cannot result in insanity, which
would be contrary to present Ohio law, 0 4 then the defendant who com-
mits a criminal act while suffering from the extreme affects of chronic
alcoholism or drug dependence will have no defense available to him be-
cause of his sickness and will be prosecuted in the same manner as a de-
fendant who commits the same act but who is not suffering from chronic
alcoholism or drug dependence.
If this is so, it is the equivalent of stating that the proposed substituted
code considers those who commit unlawful acts while suffering from the ex-
treme symptoms of chronic alcoholism or drug dependence as appropriate
candidates for criminal sanctions rather than as appropriate candidates
for medical aid. If the above assumptions and reasoning are correct, there
can be no justifiable policy grounds to support the contraction of the defi-
nition of mental disease; and it must be expanded to reflect the original
proposal's definition.
Aside from the matter of the definition of mental disease found in the
substitute proposal, both the substitute and original proposals of the insan-
ity defense appear to be examples of reasonable legislative action. They
represent a recognition that a defendant who did not know what lie was
doing or could not control what he was doing, even if he knew it were
wrong, should not be subjected to the law's criminal sanctions. Which is to
say, they represent a recognition that to apply criminal sanctions to a
mentally ill defendant would neither deter nor rehabilitate that defendant
and thereby not assure that he would not commit criminal acts in the fu-
ture. 0 5
104 Rucker v. State, 119 Ohio St. 189, 162 N.E. 802 (1928).




A final observation on these four affirmative defenses must be directed
at the burden and degree of proof required by the defendant to success-
fully assert them. That section of the Proposed Criminal Code, in both its
original and substitute versions dealing with this matter, is presented below.
The original proposal:
Sec. 2901.05. (A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed in-
nocent until proved guilty.
(B) No person shall be convicted of an offense unless his guilt is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This division does not require the
prosecution to rebut an affirmative defense until the accused adduces evi-
dence supporting such defense.
(C) "Reasonable doubt" is that state of the case which, after the en-
tire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of
the jurors in such condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding con-
viction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. Reasonable doubt
is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs
or depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt.
(D) An "affirmative defense" is either of the following:
(1) A defense expressly designated as affirmative;
(2) A defense involving an excuse or justification peculiarly within
the knowledge of the accused, on which he can fairly be required to ad-
duce supporting evidence.' 0O
The substitute proposal:
Sec. 2901.05. (A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed in-
nocent until proved guilty.
(B) No person shall be convicted of an offense unless his guilt is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof is upon the
prosecution.
(C) Except for the defenses of intoxication and insanity contained in
sections 2901.35 and 2901.36 of the Revised Code, a defense or affirma-
tive defense to a criminal charge is established if it creates a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused. The defenses of intoxication and
insanity are established by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden
of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the
accused.
(D) As used in this section, "reasonable doubt" is that state of the
case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evi-
dence, leaves the minds of the jurors in such condition that they cannot
say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the
charge. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt, because everything
relating to human affairs or depending upon moral evidence is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt.
sions, does not affect the present mandatory commirtment of a defendant acquitted on the
sole ground of his insanity. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page Supp. 1970).
106 PROP. OHnO CMR CODE § 2901.05.
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(E) As used in this section, an "affirmative defense" is either of the
following:
(1) A defense expressly designated as affirmative;
(2) A defense involving an excuse or justification peculiarly within
the knowledge of the accused, on which he can fairly be required to ad-
duce supporting evidence.' 07
Under present Ohio law'08 a defendant is presumed innocent of the
crime charged until the state can prove him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. In both the original and substitute versions of the proposed sec-
tion, this requirement will remain the law. Differences between the two
versions occur, however, when considering the degree of proof required
to assert particular affirmative defenses.
Under the original version, the defendant must only "adduce evidence
supporting" whatever affirmative defense he asserts in order to initially
establish the defense. The drafters of the original version had this to say
about their proposal:
* , * If the evidence adduced by the defendant to establish his defense is
sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on the question of his guilt, then he
should be acquitted, regardless of whether he has proved the substance of
his defense by a preponderance of evidence, or by dear and convincing evi-
dence, or beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, it should remain
the prosecution's part to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt, and the part of the defense to cast a reasc.nable doubt on the
prosecution's case, if it can.' 09
The drafters of the substitute version were in general agreement with
this statement. However, they carved out two major exceptions: to wit, the
*defenses of intoxication and insanity. These, they said, must be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence. Why the exceptions? It may be
simply that since present Ohio law states that intoxication, at least volun-
tary,110 and insanity,"' must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence,
they shall continue to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The
logic of requiring the state to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt seems
inconsistent with the degree of proof required of the defendant pleading
either insanity or intoxication as a defense under the substitute version.
How can guilt of first degree murder be established by the state beyond a
reasonable doubt when a defendant adduces evidence which creates a rea-
sonable doubt as to his sanity, which is the equivalent of creating a rea-
sonable doubt as to the necessary mental element of the crime of first
'degree murder?
107 PROp. OHIO ClM. CODE § 2901.05 (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 51.1).
10 8 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.04 (Page 1954).
109 PROP. OHIo CRM. CODE § 2901.05, Committee Comments at 29.
110 Long v. State, 109 Ohio St. 77, 141 N.E. 691 (1923).
11M State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969).
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Although the United States Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon" - ap-
parently found no logical inconsistency in requiring the state to prove first
degree murder beyond reasonable doubt, while at the same time upholding
a state statute requiring a defendant to prove insanity beyond reasonable
doubt, other states have decided that an accused need only raise the in-
sanity defense by adducing some evidence which the state must rebut be-
yond a reasonable doubt.11 3
In the recent case of In re Winship"4 the United States Supreme Court
itself has now cast some doubt as to whether Leland is still effective. Mr.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated most strongly:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the rea-
sonable-doubt standard, we explicidly hold that the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.115
Mr. Justice Brennan arrived at this statement after quoting 1" from the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Leland. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said in Leland:
It is the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts
of a free society-is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law
in the historic, procedural content of "due process."' 17
Given the logical inconsistency inherent in the substitute version's re-
quirement that the state must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt while
the defendant must prove insanity or intoxication by a preponderance of
the evidence, and the serious doubt raised by Winship whether such a for-
mulation would weather a constitutional challenge, and elimination of
the special treatment afforded intoxication and insanity by the substitute
version should be undertaken, and both should be established as affrma-
tive defenses to a criminal charge if evidence of them creates a reason-
able doubt as to the guilt of the defendant.
Richard Pfeiffer
112 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
113 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
114 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
115 Id. at 364 (emphasis supplied).
116d, at 362.
17 343 U.S. at 802-03 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting).
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